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For companies worldwide, globalisation and the development of a world market require 
cooperation and mutual problem solving between the management and workers in order to be 
competitive and prosperous. Those countries which have prospered worldwide such as Japan, 
Germany and Sweden are those who have implemented statutory employee participation 
structures to foster such a partnership.
1
 It is now mostly recognised that employees are 
stakeholders of the corporation that can contribute to the shareholders’ interests of increasing the 
company’s profit. A cooperative relationship between management and workers in which 
management takes the workers’ interest into account therefore is part of Good Corporate 
Governance not only for moral but also for economic reasons. As Davis and Le Roux summarise 
this understanding, ‘the satisfaction of employees will lead to greater productivity and thus to 
increased profits, in this way maximising the interests of both employees and shareholders’.
2
 
Employee participation can be defined as a process that recognises the needs and rights of 
employees – individually as well as collectively – to participate with management in 
organisational decision making beyond that what is usually associated with collective 
bargaining.
3
 Within a corporation, participation can take place at board level, at workstation level 
between supervisor and its employees and at workplace level in the form of elected worker 
representation bodies. In addition, there is an evolving variety of employee participation schemes, 
including profit sharing, gain sharing and employee share ownership.
4
 
The parties involved in employee participation have different interests and benefit 
expectations: Employers are interested in generating higher efficiency in order to increase the 
company’s profit, employees and unions are more concerned to increase their influence over 
decision making in the workplace to improve working conditions, and the state is generally more 
interested in achieving goals of social integration but also the companies’ wealth to improve the 
economy and tax income.
5
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In South Africa, the historically adversarial confrontation climate is still not overcome and still is 
a hindrance to effective employee participation in the workplace. One of the objectives of the 
government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was to facilitate a shift from 
adversarial towards more cooperative and participative industrial relations. This can be achieved 
with labour law, as labour law is concerned with the regulation of social power which is 
described as the capacity to effectively direct the behaviour of others.
6
 
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“LRA”) was published on 10 February 1995 as a 
significant milestone on the path towards a post-apartheid South Africa based on the RDP. The 
Act tries to balance the goal of global competitiveness and with that of a stable and redistributive 
growth and is based on three pillars: The National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC) on a macro level, bargaining councils on sectoral level and workplace forums on 
plant level.
7
 One of its new features was the introduction of a statutory employee participation 
structure called a workplace forum with the aim to facilitate the shift from adversarial bargaining 
to joint problem-solving and participation by employees on selected issues in order to advance 
economic development and global competitiveness, social justice, labour peace and the 
democratisation of the workplace. The drafters of the LRA based the workplace forum system 
inter alia on the positive and successful statutory employee participation structures in Germany, 
namely works councils. 22 years after the LRA and Chapter 5 came into force there are only few 
workplace forums established in terms of the Act and relations between trade unions, employers 
and employees are still adversarial as was seen in the Marikana massacres in 2012. Despite this, 
the legislator has not made any changes to the provisions yet.  
This dissertation compares the employee participation structures in South Africa with 
those in Germany and analyses potential changes – in theory and in praxis – to make the 
institution of the workplace forum more attractive both to trade unions and employers. It further 
identifies the relevant criteria for transplants of laws from one legal system to another
8
 and 
applies these criteria in the context of employee participation. 
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Chapter 2 will depict the statutory framework of workplace forums in South Africa, 
including the history of employee participation, the relationship between workplace forums and 
trade unions and some of the reasons for the failure of the system. 
The third chapter provides an overview of the provisions regulating works councils in 
Germany, their history and the way in which trade unions and works council successful cooperate 
and benefit from each other.  
Subsequently, the fourth chapter deals with the prerequisites for a successful transfer of 
laws from one legal system to another and answers the question, whether in case of employee 
participation in Germany and South Africa, these requirements are met. This is of particular 
importance as the drafters of the LRA based Chapter 5 on the works council system in Germany, 
partly adapting it to the South African background though. 
With reference to the previous chapters, the fifth chapter then proposes several 
amendments to the LRA which may make the workplace forum more attractive for all affected 
parties. Some of the proposals stem from the positive German experience, others are specifically 
tailored to the South African context of adversarialism, high unemployment and an economic 
recession. 
Lastly, the sixth chapter comprises a summary of the findings and a conclusion. 
II. WORKPLACE FORUMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Workplace forums were introduced into the South African legal system in 1995 with the 
introduction of the new LRA. They can be established in workplaces with more than 100 
employees on application to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(“CCMA”) of a representative trade union. The LRA provides workplace forums with the right to 
consultation, the right to joint decision making and to information in order to give employees a 
voice in managerial decision making. This Chapter firstly deals with the historical background of 
employee participation in South Africa during apartheid and gives an overview of the drafting 
process of the LRA as well as the reasons for the introduction of workplace forums into the new 
LRA. Thereafter, the statutory framework of workplace forums as well as the relationship 





concludes with an outline of some of the reasons for the failure of the workplace forums system 
that are suggested by South African and international labour lawyers. 
1. Historical background 
a) Employee participation during apartheid 
Historically, workers in South Africa, especially black workers, fought against an oppressive 
regime and, in the absence of political rights, strikes were often violent. Labour legislation was 
based on racial categorisation and discrimination and there was parallel labour legislation for 
blacks, the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act 48 of 1953, and whites, the Industrial 
Conciliation Act, later renamed the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. Trade unions were racially 
divided and black workers mostly were precluded from joining trade unions. Those unions that 
admitted blacks as members could not become parties to industrial councils.
9
 Also, the definition 
of employees in terms of the Industrial Conciliations Act did not include Africans. The 
government introduced bodies such as the Central Black Labour Council, works committees and 
liaison committees in order to exclude black workers. In 1980, 2,745 liaison committees, 327 
works committees and 5 coordinating committees had been established.
10
 This formal exclusion 
of black workers, however, did not prevent them from establishing trade unions underground in 
order to protect themselves. In many instances the committees built the bases from which the 
independent unions were launched in the 1970s. This South African history of racial oppression 
and exclusion in the form of compromised forms of interest representations for black workers 
have resulted in a deep-seated mistrust of such forums which until today does not seem to have 




The recommendations by the Wiehahn Commission released on 1 May 1979 prompted a 
change to the labour laws: The Commission proposed to give black employees full trade union 
rights and permit their unions to use industrial councils, while at the same time incorporating 
African workers into the system of control and discipline that already existed in relation to white, 
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coloured and indian workers.
12
 It also recommended registration of unions in order to intensify 
state control. Thereafter, black workers gained full trade union rights as well as permission to use 
industrial councils. The situation of black employees further improved when South Africa re-
entered into the international market, labour rights were entrenched in the constitution and when 
the LRA gave effect to the recommendations passed by the International Labour Organisation 
(“ILO”). Of special importance for the following analysis is the ILO Recommendation 94/1952 
on Co-operation at the Level of the Undertaking and Recommendation 129/1967 on 
Communication within the Undertaking. Recommendation 94 states that ‘appropriate steps 
should be taken to promote consultation and co-operation between employers and workers at the 
level of the undertaking on matters of mutual concern not within the scope of collective 
bargaining machinery’. Such cooperation should, in accordance with national custom or practice, 
be promoted by laws or regulations which would establish bodies for consultation and co-
operation and determine the scope, functions, structure and methods of operation as may be 
appropriate to the conditions in the various undertakings. 
b) Drafting process of the LRA 
After the election of the first democratic government in April 1994, the Minister of Labour on 8 
August 1994 appointed a Ministerial Legal Task Team (“Task Team”) under the convenorship of 
Halton Cheadle to prepare a negotiating document in draft Bill form to initiate public discussion 
about a far reaching labour law reform. The task team consisted of several highly respected South 
African Labour lawyers and was assisted throughout the drafting process by the ILO and three 
international experts one of which was Manfred Weiss, a German Labour Law and Comparative 
Law Professor at the University of Frankfurt. In the Task Team’s letter of appointment workplace 
forums and co-determination were not explicitly mentioned but it stated that the draft Bill should 
give effect to the RDP.
13
 The RDP White Paper in section 3.11.4. refers to employee participation 
in the following words: ‘Industrial democracy will facilitate greater worker participation and 
decision making in the workplace. The empowerment of workers will be enhanced through 
access to company information. […]’.
14
 At the same time, chapter 5 was explicitly drafted to 
improve productivity and quality levels to facilitate South Africa’s re-entry into international 
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markets. In an interview with Amanda Armstrong, a member of the Task Team, she said that 
‘when we looked at other countries the more successful way of restructuring entailed co-
determination rather than adversarial relations and hence the main model for us was Germany’.
15
 
The draft Bill was presented at the NEDLAC’s Labour Market Chamber for consideration by 
labour, business and government on 2 February 1995. The social partners, NEDLAC, the Public 
Service Bargaining Council and the Education Labour Relations Council, commented on the draft 
bill. During a three months period of negotiations, the main issues of contention were the union 
trigger, the items for joint decision-making, the information disclosure provisions and the 
relationship between workplace forums and collective bargaining. The government was 
committed to a statutory introduction of worker representation in the workplace, though 
highlighting some areas which it believed required more intensive consideration such as the 
proposal that workplace forums are employee- and not trade union based and that only 
representative unions may trigger the establishment of the workplace forum. Labour demanded a 
union-based forum, fearing that trade unions and shop steward structures could be undermined by 
workplace forums. They further demanded a provision that enables the dissolution of an 
established workplace forum. Business essentially argued against the union trigger and wanted to 
establish employer-initiated workplace forums.
16
 The final bill strives to strike a balance between 
these conflicting demands and interests of management and labour by providing for forums that 
are not merely meant to be trade union extensions but over which representative trade unions 
have extensive control. 
2. Purpose of workplace forums in the South African context 
Pursuant to section 1(d)(iii) of the LRA, one of the main purposes of the LRA is to promote 
employee participation in decision-making in the workplace. This was supposed to be achieved 
through the introduction of workplace forums as statutory employee participation structures in 
the workplace. 
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The purpose of workplace forums was both ‘transformative’ and ‘best practice’
17
: The legislator 
sought to facilitate a shift from adversarialism to cooperative problem-solving in a more facilitate 
the reconstruction and development of post-apartheid South Africa. 
The Task Team, when proposing the workplace forum system, presumed that in order to 
improve efficiency and productivity and thereby profitability, an employee participation system 
as a ‘second channel’ of industrial relations is needed.
18
 Referring to economically successful 
countries such as Japan, Germany and Sweden, worker participation is seen as the key factor to 
increased productivity and therefore competitiveness in the global market. The aim of the 
introduction of workplace forums into the South African labour law system was to ‘facilitate a 
shift, at the workplace, from adversarial collective bargaining on all matters to joint problem-
solving and participation on certain subjects.’
19
 This ‘second channel’ is not supposed to 
undermine collective bargaining but to supplement it by way of giving the employees a voice in 
managerial decision making in non-wage matters, such as restructuring, the introduction of new 
technologies and works methods, changes in the organisation of work, physical conditions of 
work and health and safety.
20
 According to studies of similar structures in the U.S. and European 
countries, employee participation contributes to economic performance of companies by way of 
improving communication between management and workforce as well as the quality of 
decisions and by facilitating the implementation of decisions in workplaces.
21
 Based on the 
assumption that a compulsory imposition of employee participation structures would be 
unsuccessful, the LRA provides that workplace forums can only be triggered by representative 
trade unions even though it explicitly states that the forum is supposed to represent all employees 
in the workplace and not only trade union members. There are two exceptions to this general rule: 
First, senior managerial employees are excluded from the scope of workplace forums and 
secondly, if the workplace forum is trade union based in terms of section 81 of the LRA, the 
representative trade union chooses the members of the forum from amongst its elected 
representatives, ie shop stewards, in the workplace.
22
 The LRA provides for three forms of 
participation being information sharing, consultation and joint decision-making as well as the 
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establishment of a deadlock-breaking mechanism which includes arbitration and mediation. 
Where a dispute is referred to arbitration, as it is the case only in matters of joint decision-
making, the right to strike and lockout is removed.
23
 Further, as workplace forums are based on 
voluntarism, the LRA does not impose a standardised form of workplace forums but provides a 
floor of rights above which the employer and the representative trade union can agree on various 
forms of schemes. 
24
 
To summarise, the drafters of the LRA based the introduction of workplace forums on the 
following principle assumptions: First, there is a qualitative difference between distributive issues 
(such as wages and conditions of employment) and productivity issues (such as changes in the 
organisation of work and health and safety). This goes with the assertion that production issues 
can best be dealt with at the level of the individual workplaces. Further, the drafters assumed that 
qualitative issues are predominantly consensual, whereas quantitative issues are mainly 
conflictual. Therefore, the traditional collective bargaining structures are regarded as unsuited to 
solve production-related issues and disputes. A strict and clear separation between production and 
distributive issues can only be achieved through the establishment of two separate institutions. 




a) Step away from adversarialism 
Traditionally, there is a fundamental conflict between labour and profit: workers seek to increase 
their wages which inevitably reduces the shareholders’ return on capital. Both common law as 
well as the Companies Act 71 of 2008 in section 76(3)(b) require the directors to act in the best 
interests of the company. This leads to the question discussed in Corporate Governance in whose 
interests a corporation generally should operate. This debate can be traced back to an exchange 
between Berle and Dodd in 1931 at Harvard University. Berle suggested that the directors of a 
company exercise their power solely in the interests of the shareholders of the company as the 
only purpose of the company is to maximise the shareholders’ profits (so called ‘shareholder-
primacy approach’).
26
 Shareholders provide the company with capital and as residual claimants 
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of whatever is left over after all other claims have been paid assume the risk of the business. By 
contrast, Dodd asserted that a corporation is not conducted in a vacuum and that other 
stakeholders such as employees, consumers or the society have to be taken into account. He 
contended that a commitment to the interests of other stakeholders such as employees or 
customers will ultimately benefit the shareholders as the employees’ satisfaction can lead to 
greater productivity and thus increase the shareholders’ profit.
27
 The Companies Act follows this 
so-called ‘enlightened shareholder model’
28
. It requires directors to take other stakeholders’ 
interests into account, provided that these are subordinated to the primary role of profit 
maximisation.  
Although the employees’ satisfaction is generally recognised as a key factor to a 
company’s long-term sustainability and profitability, the relationship between labour and profit is 
still adversarial. The South African labour legislation is based upon a liberal market system in 
which collective bargaining between trade unions and employers’ organisations is the 
predominant system of employee participation.
29
 The LRA, however, does not impose a duty to 
bargain on the employer, it is a voluntary system that is based on the exercise of economic power. 
It is therefore not the interference of the law, but the balance of forces that determines the 
outcome.
30
 This approach to collective bargaining was introduced by Kahn-Freund and is based 
on a ‘collective laissez-faire’ approach.
31
 The liberal market system is characterised by an 
adversarial relationship between employees and employers. Negotiations often take place in bad 
faith, leading to violent industrial action measures.  
Brand describes the manner of negotiations between trade unions and employers as 
follows:
32
 Both parties take the view that the higher their initial demand, the more likely it is that 
the negotiations will turn out in their favour which often makes it impossible from the beginning 
to breach the gap between their positions. At the bargaining table, no serious dialogue takes place 
and unions often assume that real negotiations will only take place once the employer is faced 
with a strike action. Negotiations are therefore only seen as a pointless formality and trade unions 
aim at referring the dispute to the CCMA as soon as possible. The often violent strike actions are 
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counterproductive to both employees and employers: Trade unions do not have the means to 
sustain their strikes for a longer period and employers are faced with high costs due to damage to 
property, the expenses of hiring private security firms and the costs incurred by litigation.
33
 In 
this South African model of collective bargaining; ‘deep seated antagonism rather than any form 
of partnership or dialogue operates to solve the dispute’ which makes a ‘win-win’ outcome 
impossible.
34
 Klerck once said that in the South African history of adversarialism and deep seated 




Workplace forums were, inter alia, introduced to facilitate the move away from this rigid 
adversarial ‘winner takes all’ model of labour relations, sourced in a history of class conflict 
overlaid by racist rules. The South African climate of violent strike action, high unemployment 
levels,
36
 political instability and a recessionary economic climate has placed companies under 
increasing pressure to reduce their employment costs and at the same time it has deterred foreign 
investment. 
In contrast, the ‘coordinated market system’ is found in European countries such as 
Germany.
37
 This system recognises that employees are core stakeholders of a company who 
contribute to the long-terms sustainability of the company and thus to the aim of profit 
maximisation. The German system which is regarded as the ‘first and most highly developed’ 
model of worker participation’
38
 institutionalises the employees’ views within the company on 
two levels, on plant level and on company level, and is therefore often referred to as a dual 
channel system: On company level, legislation
39
 provides for labour representation on the 
supervisory board which is institutionally separated from the management board (the so called 
‘two-tier system’). The main functions of the supervisory board are the appointment/election of 
the members of the board of directors and the supervision and control of management decisions 
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taken by the board of directors.
40
 The number of employee representatives depends on the 
number of employees of the company but can amount up to 50 % of the members of supervisory 
boards.
41
 On plant level, employee participation effectively takes place in the form of works 
councils. As a general rule, the relationship between workers and labour is more harmonious in 
coordinated market systems than in liberal market systems.
42
 Furthermore, co-determination has a 
significant impact on the directors’ compensation packages.
43
 
It is against this background that workplace forums were introduced in the post-apartheid era. 
Employee consultation and joint decision-making in production issues are aimed at developing a 
cooperative dialogue at the workplace and breaking through the adversarial confrontation climate 
in the collective bargaining process, following the German archetype of works councils and 
cooperation. 
b) Changing conditions for trade unions 
Since the 1970s, globalisation has led to structural changes in the production process as well as 
changes in the labour market. Globally, trade unions today face significant challenges. In the 
South African context, increasing unemployment levels as well as the trend towards non-
unionised and atypical forms of employment such as temporary and part-time employment and 
disguised employment relationships make it difficult for trade unions to organise in the 
workforce, leading to a decline in trade union membership.
44
 As Bob Hepple argues, the 
collective bargaining system in South Africa depends on the effective organisation by workers. 
He points out that greater legal rights to organise do not help the contemporary labour force 
consisting of temporary workers, part time worker and ‘self-employed’ workers.
45
 A decline in 
trade union density leads to a decline in collective bargaining coverage meaning the percentage 
of employees and employers subject to collective agreements.
46
 To counteract this development, 
many countries including South Africa have introduced extension mechanisms.
47
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These changing conditions weaken unions and produce an imbalance of bargaining power 
between the employer and trade unions which leads to employers pressuring for decentralised 
individual bargaining.
48
 In Bogg’s words, ‘the regulatory implication of the decline in collective 
bargaining is the increasing “procedural individualization” of the employment relation, involving 




In the middle of August 2012 a dispute over wages between rock drill operators and 
Lonmin management culminated in the events of the Marikana massacre, resulting in 34 miners 
being shot by members of the SA Police Service (SAPS).
50
 One of the reasons for what happened 
at Marikana was the collapse of the system of labour relations, especially of the collective 
bargaining system. 
In today’s trade union system, shop stewards are well paid and often sacrifice the claims 
of low-skilled workers to service special interests such as those of highly skilled workers.
51
 In the 
events of Marikana, rock drill operators did not feel represented by their traditional trade union, 
the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), and chose to be represented by a newly established 
minority union called Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). At the time 
of the massacre, AMCU had limited organisational rights at one of Lonmin’s three mines but the 




In the course of negotiations between NUM and management at Implats, another platinum 
mine, in the beginning of 2012 shortly before the Marikana massacre, the trade union negotiators 
rejected a management offer to adjust wages of rock drill operators in favour of a uniformal 
increase across all occupations by 10 %. Management in consultation with NUM subsequently 
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decided to increase the wages of miners (being first-line supervisors of work teams) by 18 %. The 
rock drill operators, obviously aggrieved by this, concluded that there was enough money 
available and that the NUM negotiators were more concerned with enhancing the occupation they 
were in being the most skilled grades. Rock drill operators did not feel represented by their trade 
union and went on strike, demanding an adjustment of their wages by 18 % as well as that 
management no longer negotiates with NUM.
53
 The strikers were successful and thereafter many 
workers resigned from the NUM and joined AMCU. 
Inspired by the events at Implats, in June 2012 rock drill operators at Lonmin also 
demanded an increase in their wages and explicitly did not want management to involve any 
trade union in the negotiation. When Lomnin management informed the NUM and AMCU 
offices about the rock drill operators’ demand, neither of them wanted to get involved in the 
discussions.
54
 The workers established their own informal strike committees in order to carry 
forward their demands.
55
 The dissatisfaction of the workers resulted in an unprotected strike that 
heightened the rivalry between AMCU and NUM and resulted in 34 mineworkers being killed. 
The strikes were driven by workers against union advice and without any union endorsement or 
support. NUM was considered the sweetheart union of management that was increasingly 
concerned with white-collar workers. Shop stewards were being paid by management, received a 
company petrol card, a company vehicle and a company cell phone. They no longer worked 
underground and therefore were freed from the burdensome labour conditions that had 
encouraged them to join the trade union in the first place. They had a lifestyle change and would 
do anything to not lose their position and lost touch with the workers doing the underground 
work in the mines.
56
 The accountability of shop stewards to members has weakened and pressure 
to account to leaders higher up as well as to management has intensified. Trade unions no longer 
met the aspirations of low-skilled and low-paid workers and formal bargaining representatives 
were replaced with informal groupings of workers.
57
 This is the opposite of the role of shop 
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stewards when the unions began to organise in the early 1970s: Back then, they were highly 
committed, low paid and did hard and dangerous work that involved rushing from one township 
meeting to another to serve the union members’ needs. 
58
  
As was seen in the events of Marikana, the majoritarian approach to collective bargaining 
implemented in the LRA, referred to as the ‘winner-takes all approach’
59
 protects the interests of 
well-established and larger unions, making it difficult for minority unions to raise their voice. At 
the same time, the emergence of smaller unions and informal workers’ committees has reduced 
the big unions’ bargaining power, leading to a loss of influence.
60
 
Therefore, it is suggested that labour law should shift its focus to contemporary forms of 
worker organisation and collective interaction. The aim of the introduction of workplace forums 
was to fill the vacuum left by the recession and the failure of the collective bargaining system. 
They were aimed at playing a significant role in regulating conditions of employment in a context 
of decentralization of production and the erosion of collective bargaining, especially where 
unions lack the capacity to bargain at workplace level. 
3. The South African legal framework 
a) Application for establishment of a workplace forum 
A workplace forum may be established in any workplace with more than 100 employees where 
there is no existing functioning workplace forum.
61
 Workplace forums in terms of Chapter 5 of 
the LRA may only be established in the private sector, whereas the establishment of workplace 
forums in the public sector may be regulated in a schedule promulgated by the Minister for the 
Public Service and Administration in terms of section 207(4) of the LRA.
62
  
In the private sector, a ‘workplace’ as defined in section 213 of the LRA generally means 
the place or places where the employees of an employer work. However, if an employer carries 
on business in two or more operations, each operation may be considered a separate workplace, 
provided these operations are independent of one another by reason of their size, function or 
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organisation. This means that there can be more than one workplace per geographic location and 
a workplace may be made up of more than one geographic location. Whereas trade unions would 




Employees are defined in section 78(a) of the LRA as any person who is employed in a 
workplace, excluding managerial employees who have the authority in terms of their contract or 
status to represent the employer in dealings with the workplace forum or to determine policy and 
take decisions on behalf of the employer that may conflict with the representation of employees 
in the workplace. 
Only a representative trade union may apply to the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”) for the establishment of a workplace forum.
64
 A 
‘representative trade union’, for the purposes of Chapter 5, means a ‘registered trade union, or 
two or more registered trade unions acting jointly, that have as members the majority of the 
employees employed by an employer in the workplace’
65
. Pursuant to item 10 of Schedule 2, the 
parties may in their constitution provide for the establishment of a co-ordinating workplace forum 
dealing with general matters concerning more than one workplace as well as subsidiary 
workplace-forums in each of the workplaces with jurisdiction over matters affecting only 
employees in this workplace. 
Procedurally, in order to establish a workplace forum, a representative trade union (or two 
or more unions acting jointly) must apply to the CCMA using the prescribed form
66
 and prove to 
the CCMA that a copy of the application has also been served on the employer.
67
 The role of the 
CCMA is limited to considering the application and verifying that the application requirements 
are met. If the CCMA is satisfied that they are met, it must appoint a commissioner to assist the 
parties in establishing a workplace forum.
68
 
It is important to note that in workplaces with fewer than 100 employees or where there is no 
majority union present, the employer and a minority union are free to voluntarily establish a 
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participatory structure by way of a collective agreement.
69
 The difference is that the union does 
not have legal power to compel the establishment of such a structure.
70
 Therefore, minority 
unions are basically left with three options: They can increase their membership to become the 
majority union, they may form joint-ventures for the purposes of gaining a majority and they can 
agree with the employer on establishing a non-statutory structure.
71
 
b) Process of establishing a workplace forum 
The LRA provides for four alternative models of establishing a workplace forum. Firstly, the 
forum can be established by way of collective agreement entered into between the employer and 
the representative trade union.
72
 The LRA does not prescribe the content of such an agreement 
and therefore leaves it to the determination of the parties. A collective agreement is binding on 
the parties in terms of section 23 of the LRA and enforceable by means of arbitration.
73
 If this 
option is chosen, then the provisions of the LRA regarding workplace forums do not apply.
74
 This 
option shows the legislator’s preference for voluntary and individually negotiated agreements 
rather than statutory regulation, as this caters for specific needs in an establishment.
75
 
Particularly, it permits the creation of workplace forums consisting exclusively of shop stewards 




Secondly, if no collective agreement is concluded between the parties, the commissioner 
must meet the parties in order to facilitate agreement between them on the provisions of a 
constitution of the workplace forum.
77
 The constitution must deal with the obligatory matters laid 
down by section 82(1) of the LRA and may deal with the optional matters in section 82(2) of the 
LRA, taking into account the guidelines in Schedule 2 of the LRA. 
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Thirdly, the commissioner can constitute a workplace forum and determine the provisions of the 
constitution, thereby using the guidelines of Schedule 2 of the LRA ‘in a manner that best suits 
the particular workplace involved’.
78
 The commissioner is required to determine only those 
provisions the parties cannot agree on.
79
 
Lastly, section 81 of the LRA makes special provision for a trade union based workplace 
forum. A representative trade union that is recognised in terms of a collective agreement by the 
employer for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect of all employees in the workplace 
may apply to the CCMA for the establishment of a workplace forum.
80
 In this case, all the 
provisions set out in Chapter 5 of the LRA will apply except those dealing with the election 
process.
81
 Instead, the representative trade union may choose the members of the forum from 
among its elected representatives in the workplace.
82
 This could potentially lead to a conflict of 
interest as the shop stewards as members of the workplace forum would need to promote 
efficiency in the workplace
83




The members of the workplace forum are directly elected by all employees in the workplace 
and the right to vote is not restricted to trade union members.
85
 Likewise, section 79(a) of the 
LRA charges the workplace forum with representing the entire workforce. The constitution must 
include a formula for determining the number of seats in the forum
86
 as well as for the 
distribution of those so as to reflect the occupational structures of the workplace.
87
 This is aimed 
at ensuring that non-unionised workers are given a voice on the forum. However, as employees 
not subject to collective agreements might try to air their grievances of collective bargaining 
issues such as pay, this provision may lead to demarcation issues. On the other hand, the forum 
can be used to enhance communication between different sections of the workforce who may 
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otherwise be hostile to each other.
88
 The constitution must further provide for the appointment of 
an employee as election officer.
89
 
c) Functions and powers of the workplace forum 
The general functions of the workplace forum are set out in section 79 of the LRA as follows:  
(i) to promote the interests of all employees (whether trade union members or not) 
(ii) to enhance efficiency in the workplace 
(iii) to be consulted by the employer, with a view to reaching consensus, about the matters listed 
in section 84 
(iv) to participate in joint decision making about the matters referred to in section 86. 
The LRA provides for three forms of participation rights in order to achieve these goals, being 




 and joint decision-making.
92
 It is important 
to note that the LRA does not provide for a right of workplace forums to initiate consultation or 
joint decision-making. Therefore, a workplace forum generally can only act reactively with one 
exception: Pursuant to section 87, a newly established forum may request a meeting with the 
employer to review merit criteria and discretionary bonuses, disciplinary codes and procedures, 
and non-work performance related conduct.
93
 The following briefly describes the workplace 
forum’s participation rights. 
aa) Disclosure of information 
Pursuant to section 89 (1) of the LRA, an employer is obliged to disclose to its workplace forum 
all relevant information that will allow the workplace forum to engage effectively in 
consultation
94
 and joint decision-making.
95
 However, section 89(2) of the LRA provides for 
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limits to this duty that are identical to those in the context of collective bargaining
96
, for example 
if the information is legally privileged or confidential. The employer must inform the forum in 
writing if and what kind of information is confidential.
97
 A dispute regarding the disclosure of 
information can be referred to the CCMA by either party.
98
 If the dispute remains unresolved 
after conciliation, any party may request for it to be resolved through arbitration.
99
 
In any dispute, the commissioner has the power to decide whether or not the requested 
information is relevant.
100
 If he or she decides that the information is relevant and if it is 
confidential or private personal information relating to an employee, the commissioner is 
required to ‘balance the harm that the disclosure is likely to cause to an employee or employer 
against the harm that the failure to disclose the information is likely to cause to the ability of the 
workplace forum to engage effectively in consultation and joint decision-making’.
101
 Section 91 
of the LRA provides that if the commissioner finds in a dispute about an alleged breach of 
confidentiality that such breach has occurred, the commissioner may order the withdrawal of the 
right to the disclosure of information for a period specified in the arbitration award. This section 
therefore penalises the misuse of confidential information ex post facto.
102
 
In addition, the workplace forum may request to inspect any documented information that is 
required to be disclosed by the employer and the employer is required to provide copies.
103
 If 
there is a dispute about an alleged breach of confidentiality, the commissioner may in its 
arbitration award order to withdraw the right to disclosure of information for a certain period.
104
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Section 85(1) of the LRA requires the employer to consult the workplace forums and attempt to 
reach consensus with it before implementing a proposal on any of the following topics:
105
 
(a) restructuring of the workplace, including the introduction of new technology and new 
work methods 
(b) changes in the organisation of work 
(c) plant closures 
(d) mergers and transfers of ownership in so far as they have an impact on the employees 
(e) dismissal of employees for reasons based on operational requirements 
(f) exemptions from any collective agreement or any law 
(g) job grading 
(h) criteria for merit increases or the payment of discretionary bonuses 
(i) education and training 
(j) product development plans 
(k) export promotion. 
Additionally, the employer must consult the forum on any matter that may affect employees in 
the workplace arising from the report on the employer’s financial and employment situation, its 
previous and anticipated future performance in the short term and long term which the employer 
is obliged to present at each of its meetings with the forum.
106
  
There are three ways in which this list can be extended: A bargaining council may add 
matters in workplaces that fall within its registered scope.
107
 The representative trade union may 
also conclude a collective agreement with the employer adding additional matters
108
 and any 
other law may confer on the workplace forum the right to be consulted about additional 
matters.
109
 Further, an agreement can be reached between the representative trade union and the 
employer in terms of which the workplace forum may exercise health and safety functions.
110
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The process of consultation is described as follows: First, the employer is required to disclose to 
the workplace forum, subject to the limitations in section 89 of the LRA, all relevant information 
that will enable it to engage effectively in consultation.
111
 The employer must then allow the 
workplace forum an opportunity to make representations and to advance alternative proposals.
112
 
The employer must consider those and respond to them, if the employer does not agree with 
them, stating the reasons for disagreeing.
113
  
Section 85 of the LRA requires the employer to do more than notify the forum of any 
proposal and in good faith to consider any suggestions it may make. The process must involve 
serious discussion between both parties on a collective basis. Steadman suggests that consultation 
means ‘negotiation’ as the employer is required to reach consensus with the forum which is akin 
to the meaning of good faith bargaining.
114
 This constitutes an extensive inroad into 
managements’ prerogative and departs from international consultation requirements in terms of 
which the employer, after hearing the forum, has the right for final decision.
115
 Also, it is 
suggested that this could lead to a prolonged consultation process and force the employer into 
various proceedings before being able to implement a decision.
116
 
If the parties are unable to reach consensus after the consultation process the employer 
must invoke any agreed procedure to resolve any differences before implementing the 
proposal.
117
 This has the effect that, in principle, it remains possible to embark upon industrial 
action, unless the agreed dispute resolution procedure provides otherwise.
118
 Strike action is only 
possible though in respect of the employer’s proposal itself and not in respect of any alleged 
procedural defects in the consultation process (which must be referred to arbitration in terms of 
section 94 of the LRA).
119
 Alternatively, the employer may withdraw the proposal or unilaterally 
implement it, and then possibly face a normal dispute that could result in industrial action.
120
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The right to initiate the consultation process by submitting proposals is restricted to 
employers, the workplace forum is not given the right to raise new issues. This departure from 




cc) Joint decision-making 
Joint-decision making in terms of section 86 of the LRA requires the employer to consult and 
reach consensus with a workplace forum before implementing any proposal in respect of any 
matters agreed to in a collective agreement or, in the absence of a collective agreement, in respect 
of any matters listed in section 86 (1) (a)-(d) of the LRA.  
Joint decision-making limits the employer’s managerial prerogative and breaks with 
unilateral and hierarchical decision-making in the workplace as employees can prevent the 
employer from deciding on a particular issue unless the consent of the workplace forum has been 
obtained.
122
 In South Africa - in contrast to many European countries
123
 - the list of matters for 
joint decision-making in section 86 (2) of the LRA is limited to the following four subjects: (a) 
disciplinary codes and procedures, (b) rules relating to the proper regulation of the workplace 
applying to the conduct, (c) measures designed to protect and advance persons disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination, particularly affirmative action programmes,
124
 and (d) changes to the rules 
of employer-controlled social benefit schemes. The employer and the representative trade union 
can conclude a collective agreement adding additional matters or removing any of the matters 
listed in section 86(1) of the LRA.
125
 Any other law may also confer the right to participate in 
joint decision-making about additional matters.
126
 
The consensus reached between the workplace forum and the employer in itself has no 
legal status and is not legally binding on the parties. It can only have legal effect to the extent that 
it is incorporated in a binding workplace rule, contracts of employment or a subsequent collective 
agreement. 
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If the parties are unable to reach agreement on a matter of joint decision-making, the 
employer may withdraw the proposal or refer it to arbitration in terms of a procedure agreed on in 
terms of section 80(2) of the LRA or to the CCMA as a dispute for conciliation if there is no 
agreed procedure.
127
 The employer must satisfy the Commission that a copy of the referral has 
been served on the chairperson of the workplace forum
128
 and the CCMA must attempt to resolve 
the dispute through conciliation
129
 If it remains unresolved, the employer may request that the 
dispute be resolved through arbitration.
130
 The employer may not unilaterally implement a 
proposal, and there is no right to strike over issues for joint decision making.
131
 
d) Constitution of the workplace forum 
Pursuant to section 82(1)(r) of the LRA, the constitution must require the employer to provide, at 
its cost, adequate facilities to the workplace forum in order to perform its functions. This includes 
fees, facilities and materials necessary for the election process
132
 as well as administrative and 
secretarial facilities (including, but not limited to a room with access to a telephone) that are 
necessary for the workplace forum’s fulfilment of its duties.
133
 The costs incurred must be 
reasonable, having regard to the size and capabilities of the employer.
134
 
The constitution of the workplace forum must further include provisions governing time 
off with pay during working hours in order to perform the functions and duties of a member of a 
workplace forum and in order to undergo relevant training.
135
 The time off must be reasonable, so 
as to prevent the undue disruption of work.
136
 The costs incurred by training measures must be 
paid by the employer provided that they are reasonable in regard to the size and capabilities of the 
employer.
137
 If a workplace consists of more than 1,000 employees, the constitution must provide 
for the designation of full-time workplace forum members.  
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The constitution of the workplace forum must also provide that the workplace forum may ask 
experts to assist it in the performance of its functions and to attend any meeting of the workplace 
forum, including such with the employer or employees. An expert is entitled to any information 
to which the workplace forum is entitled to and may inspect and copy any document the 
workplace forum is entitled to inspect.
138
 The Act does not explicitly determine who should pay 
the costs of inviting an expert. However, since the workplace forum does not have own means it 
is likely that the employer will have to pay for the costs if they are reasonable, having regard to 
its size and capabilities.
139
 
e) Non-statutory structures 
Apart from statutory workplace forums, non-statutory worker participation structures existed in 
South Africa prior to the new LRA and still continue to be established. In workplaces with fewer 
than 100 employees or where there is no representative union but also in any other workplace, the 
employer and a union are free to establish a participatory structure with all or only some of the 
functions determined in Chapter 5. Such an agreement is binding on the parties and enforceable 
in terms of section 23 of the LRA. Non-statutory structures permit the most flexible arrangements 
and can be tailored entirely to the specific workplace and the parties’ needs and wishes.
140
 
Research shows that non-statutory employee representation structures have proliferated, mostly 
driven by management.
141
 Steadman even suggests that the statutory provisions have provided an 
impetus for employers and trade unions to establish non-statutory structures.
142
  
The most important difference is that such a structure can only be established in agreement 
with the employer. Further, the structures differ from the statutory structures: In most cases, both 
management and employee representatives are party to the forum. The structure is mostly 
described in a constitution, not necessarily in the form of a collective agreement in terms of the 
Act. In a study conducted at Rand Water Participation, Co-operation and Partnership conducted 
by Opperman and Steadman, shop stewards as well as managers reported that employee 
participation structures have reduced conflict and the adversarial nature of communication 
between management and the employees. Moreover, the decision-making process has become 
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more efficient and effective leading to a more democratic, equitable and empowering work 
environment.
143
 According to their studies, difficulties arise when employee participation systems 
are not effectively managed and monitored: Decision making may take longer, may absorb 
greater resources and therefore cause costs.
144
  
4. Relationship between trade unions and workplace forums 
South African trade unions have historically been hostile to forms of worker consultation which 
they believed may 'result in co-option’ by management and the ‘blunting of class struggle’.
145
 In 
response to this, the LRA subordinates workplace forums to the collective bargaining process so 
that a workplace forum is essentially a trade union rather than an employee-controlled system of 
participation even though it represents all employees in a workplace.
146
  
a) Statutory framework favouring trade unions 
The following serves as an overview of the statutory rights of trade unions (most of which are 
exclusively granted to representative trade unions) in relation to workplace forums: 




b) The primary option of establishing a workplace forum is one created by collective agreement 
between the employer, the representative trade union and any registered trade union that has 
members employed in the workplace.
148
 If the workplace forum is established by collective 
agreement, the provisions of the LRA do not apply.
149
 
c) The LRA provides for a trade union based workplace forum if the representative trade union 
is recognised in terms of a collective agreement by an employer for the purposes of collective 
bargaining in respect of all employees in the workplace. Such trade union may then choose 
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d) If another registered trade union becomes representative, it may demand a new election at any 
time within 21 months after each preceding election.
151
 
e) Any registered trade union with members at the workplace may nominate candidates for 
election to the workplace forum.
152
 
f) Office-bearers or officials of the representative trade union may attend meetings of the 
workplace forum, including meetings with the employer or the employees.
153
 
g) The representative trade union and the employer may, by agreement, change the constitution 
of the workplace forum.
154
 
h) If any of the statutory matters for consultation or joint decision-making are regulated by a 
collective agreement with the representative trade union, they are excluded from the agenda 
of the workplace forum. 
155
 
i) The representative trade union and the employer may by collective agreement add matters to 
the agenda of joint decision making and consultation
156
 and may remove all or any of the 
statutory topics for joint decision-making.
157
 
j) A representative trade union may request a ballot to dissolve a workplace forum. If more than 
50 per cent of the employees who have voted in the ballot support the dissolution of the 
workplace forum, it must be dissolved.
158
 
b) Demarcation of issues for collective bargaining 
The LRA does not provide for a clear demarcation of issues subject to collective bargaining and 
issues that should be dealt with by workplace forums. Collective bargaining generally takes place 
to ‘determine wages, terms and conditions of employment and other matters of mutual 
interest‘.
159
 The courts have interpreted the term ‘matter of mutual interests’ broadly so as to 
include issues beyond those that directly concern the employment relationship, such as wages, 
and includes issues that are generally of significance or of interest to the parties.
160
 This includes 
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production related matters, such as restructuring, so that in fact trade unions partially have to 
relinquish their issues for collective bargaining and place them on workplace forum. However, 
the scope of the right to bargain collectively is limited upon the so-called ‘core areas’ of the 
employer’s managerial prerogative such as determining the direction, plans and policies of the 
business. Key strategic and operational decisions relating to the running of the business are 
therefore left to management or to consultation/joint decision-making with the workplace 
forum.
161
 However, in Pikitup (Soc)Ltd v SAMWU,
162
 the issue in dispute was the employer’s 
decision to breathalyse its drivers and to institute a biometric time and attendance system. The 
court held that merely because the breathalyser test fell within the scope of ‘managerial 
prerogative’, this does not automatically mean that it is excluded from the class of matters of 
mutual interest. 
Since the issues are not clearly separated, unions fear that if they initiate the establishment of 
workplace forums, they will lose power and influence in the workplace. Sections 84(1) and 86(1) 
of the LRA safeguard unions and provide for a prerogative of representative trade unions to 
decide on the matters for consultation and joint decision-making. This makes workplace forums 
dependent upon unions to be effective which can create a platform of competition between both 
bodies. 
c) Trade unions’ perception towards workplace forums 
The introduction of workplace forums can in theory have practical benefits for trade unions. One 
of the reasons for the introduction of workplace forums was that collective bargaining was often 
confined to matters such as wages and working conditions as shop stewards may not have the 
resources and skills to introduce their own ideas in matters such as technology, productivity and 
the reorganisation of work.
163
 However, through the extensive list of statutory matters for 
consultation in section 84(1) of the LRA, substantial employee involvement and workplace 
democratisation may be encouraged and unions strengthened. Further, unions are given the 
opportunity through the workplace forums to recruit members, especially more skilled and white-
collar employees. Baskin notes that workplace forums could also encourage inter-union 
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cooperation at the workplace even while union rivalry continues at sectoral level.
164
 Further, the 
employer is obliged to disclose all relevant information in respect of matters of consultation and 
joint decision-making
165
 (except for issues subject to the limitations in section 89(2) of the LRA) 
which can also benefit the unions.
166
 
Research conducted by Van Zyl in 1997 within fourteen trade unions showed that trade 
unions saw possible benefits in establishing workplace forums such as the promotion of 
workplace democracy, the enhancement of participation and co-operation, increased worker 
participation especially in workplaces where literacy levels of workers are high and the disclosure 
of information would therefore benefit workplace forums and unions. On the other hand, trade 
unions were concerned that in sectors with low skilled workers and a low literacy rate would not 
be able to deal with the complex issues workplace forums are supposed to deal with and therefore 
would need special training. Further, unions feared that workplace forums may undermine and 
weaken unions and replace the existing shop steward structure.
167
 They also feared that 
management may influence them as unions do not have sufficient control over the forums. 
According to studies conducted by Wood and Mahabir in two workplace forums in 1998, trade 
unions argued that if they leave matters to the workplace forum, the employer is given too much 
power as section 84 of the LRA does not require the parties to conclude an agreement and an 
attempt to reach consensus by the employer is sufficient.
168
 Also, it was argued that union 
officials lack the time and resources to deal with workplace forum issues, attend the meetings and 
provide expert advice. Trade unions feared a decline in their membership as the employees’ 
representation through the workplace forum does not depend on trade union membership.
169
 
Since the establishment of a workplace forum requires an application of the representative trade 
union to the CCMA, the prevailing opposition and mistrust of trade unions towards the forums is 
one of the main reasons why there are so few forums established in South Africa. 
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d) Criticism of the statutory model 
The relationship between trade unions and workplace forums as regulated in the LRA has been 
subject to criticism.  
Some believe that the demarcation in the LRA between trade unions and workplace 
forums does not go far enough and that the LRA provides unions with too much power over 
workplace forums. As their establishment and dissolution as well as the range of topics that are 
subject to consultation and joint decision-making depends on the trade unions’ wishes, forums 
are constrained to acting as an extension of trade unions rather than a genuine employee 
participation structure.
170
 This could lead to a situation like in the U.S. where bargaining is 
predominantly at plant level and adversarial attitudes of the bargaining table carry over to daily 
plant relationships.
171
 Making workplace forums overly dependent on collective bargaining 
creates a platform of competition between both worker representation structures.
172
 The danger is 
that the workplace forum becomes ‘yet another bargaining forum whose proceedings are 




Von Holdt has argued that because of the adversarial industrial relations in South Africa it 
is not possible to create two separate institutions charged with representing the employees’ 
interests without creating conflict.
 174
 Whilst in Germany, there is a clear separation between 
adversarial bargaining at sectoral level and codetermination at workplace level,
175
 in South Africa 
industrial relations are less centralised and workplace forums have to coexist with formalised 
plant level bargaining which inevitably allows room for demarcation disputes.
176
 Many smaller 
unions prefer to operate on a plant level basis because this is the only level where they can have a 
significant impact. Similarly, employers prefer plant level bargaining, as it is more flexible and 
allows for agreements more aligned with the circumstances of the specific plant.
177
 Having two 
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different institutions representing employee interests at workplace level can give rise to 
competition and conflict.
178
 Von Holdt therefore sees the trade union based workplace forum in 
terms of section 81 of the LRA as the only workable type which in effect means giving the shop 
stewards committees the right of consultation and joint decision-making as regulated in Chapter 5 
of the LRA. This would, however, not be in line with the objective of the LRA to facilitate a shift 
at the workplace from adversarial collective bargaining to joint problem-solving and 
cooperation.
179
 Others fear that the workplace forums will prove to be more effective than trade 
unions in representing the employees’ interests which could lead to workers transferring their 
loyalty to workplace forum, thereby further weakening the position of trade unions.
180
  
Von Holdt criticises the division between distributive and cooperative issues introduced by 
the LRA. He questions the assumption that collective bargaining relations are conflictual, 
whereas production and human resource issues are not and can therefore be dealt with 
cooperatively. Productivity issues such as training, health and safety, production targets and 
staffing levels impact on cost and benefit and can similarly lead to conflict. Von Hold suggests 
that workers can only influence the employer’s decision-making through a combination of 
organisational strength and legal rights.
181
 
5. Reasons for the failure of workplace forums 
The introduction of workplace forums in South Africa is based on the assumption that 
participatory structures increase productivity and thereby lead to success in international markets. 
It is asserted that employee participation improves the quality of workers’ working life and 
provides a democratic workplace. Furthermore, employees will more likely be committed to the 
management decisions taken in this forum. An increased flow of information can enhance the 
efficiency of a corporation as management can gain access to the workers’ knowledge of the 
production process and make informed decisions which can help to avoid mistakes. As Summers 
pointed out in his studies of workplace forums from a comparative perspective, ‘workers have 
knowledge about the reality of production in their workplace, the cause of defective products, lost 
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time and work injuries, and the potential for involvement which management never learns’.
182
 
Further, the disclosure of information provisions can be beneficial for unions.
183
  
A study conducted by Msweli-Mbanga and Potwana confirms that access to participation 
is positively associated with willingness to participate and that the more access employees have 
to participation, the less the resistance to change efforts within an organisation.
184
 Greater 
responsibility is suggested to lead to greater interest and enhanced motivation and loyalty to the 
employer. 
Despite all these potential benefits of workplace forums in theory, the introduction of 
statutory workplace forums in South Africa has not been successful. A  number of reasons have 
been suggested for this. The Sociology of Work Unit at the University of Witwatersrand has 
monitored workplace forums since 1997 and makes the following observations:
185
 
 Unions opposed the idea of workplace forums because they feared they would undermine 
the collective bargaining system. 
 Employers opposed the idea of workplace forums, fearing their managerial prerogative 
would be undermined. 
 Relationship between employers and employees in South Africa is still adversarial and 
not conducive to workplace forums. 
 The prevailing economic climate of downsizing, mergers and relocations is not conducive 
to the establishment of workplace forums. 
 Workers have limited capacity to participate meaningful and effectively in workplace 
forums. 
 The small size of many corporations is an obstacle to the establishment of workplace 
forums. 
The idea driving the Task Team that participation positively correlates with productivity, job 
security and power sharing levels has been criticised by the academic literature.
186
 Klerck 
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assumes that the significance of workplace forums lies in the ability to remove obstacles to 
further productivity and economic growth rather than providing a direct contribution to the levels 
of output.
187
 Furthermore, according to studies conducted by Wood and Mahabir in two 
workplace forums in 1998, even though the introduction of workplace forums has improved 
communication between workers and management, this did not result in a visible increase in 
productivity.
188
 In one of the forums examined not one issue was discussed for consultation 
purposes and the majority union, after establishing the forum, had shown no further interest in it 
and focused on wage negotiations. Both employer and employee representatives stated that 




It was further criticised that, from a short-term perspective, participation absorbs greater 
resources such as more preparation time, paperwork, meetings and time off for training.
190
 
Moreover, the assumption underlying the LRA that productivity issues are cooperative whereas 
distributive issues are inherently adversarial is often contested. Klerck suggests that this 
assumption can easily be reverted by arguing that productivity issues go to the heart of the 
employers’ managerial prerogative and are therefore more likely to provoke the employer’s 
opposition than distributive issues.
191
  
Another reason for the small number of forums established is the requirement that only 
representative trade unions can trigger the establishment of a forum only in workplaces with 
more than 100 employees. The threshold of 100 employees is aimed at assisting small and 
medium employers by relieving them from the duty to consult as the Task Team believed that 
larger workplaces are more likely to have the resources and skills required for the successful 
functioning of the workplace forum. 
192
 When the LRA was introduced in 1995, it was estimated 
that this requirement alone would limit the application of the provisions to only about 26 % of the 
workers in the formal sector.
193
 The sectors that were excluded contributed 58 percent of the 
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 This high threshold not only excludes small businesses but also large 
companies in the retail sector for example
195
 that employs thousands of workers but where 
individual workplaces have fewer than 100 employees. Further, as only majority unions within a 
workplace may apply for the establishment of a workplace forum,
196
 workplaces in which no 
union (or more unions jointly) can boast majority support are also excluded. In 1995, when the 
LRA was introduced, 75 percent of the economically active population did not belong to 
unions.
197
 Chapter 5 therefore does not apply to those establishments in which employees are in 
the most need of participation structures and this disadvantages unorganised workers as well as 
workers in small businesses, especially in sectors such as agriculture.
198
 Bendix in her book 
concluded that the decision to assign the establishment of forums to majority unions was a 




Moreover, as mentioned above,
200
 trade unions see workplace forums as potential 
competitors which could be manipulated by management to undermine unions at plant level. 
They are concerned that forums will erode union power and collective bargaining structures 
especially as the LRA does not place a duty to bargain on the employer.
201
 Majority unions argue 
that workplace forums will result in cooption and a division of workers and strengthen non-union 
and minority union interests. 
202
 Trade unions further argue that the works councils have 
insufficient countervailing power because they don’t possess the strike weapon and because they 
are dependent on the employer.
203
 
Not only trade unions but also management raise concerns. Employers claimed that the 
provisions in Chapter 5 introduced ‘far-reaching new rights for employees going to the heart of 
business effectiveness and efficiency while there was no corresponding protection for employers 
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against the abuse and misuse of these rights by employees’.
204
 Workplace forums are seen as an 
infringement of the employers' management prerogative, control, authority and power and 
management fears that the forum will meet union interests but that employer interests will not be 
met.
205
 It is expected that workplace forums would delay decision-making, have many direct as 
well as indirect costs such as those in time and money of establishing and maintaining workplace 
forums.
206
 The effect of democratisation of the workplace on organisational efficiency, 
responsiveness and flexibility is unpredictable. They further claim that the principle of 
voluntarism had been ignored as entry into the workplace forums system is compulsory for 
employers once a representative trade union has initiated the establishment of the forum.
207
 Also, 
the confidentiality provisions do not provide enough protection against the disclosure of 
confidential information.
208
 Management raises concerns about the employees’ capability to 
understand the issues in dispute and the ability and capacity of unions to provide for the 
necessary support structure through the shop stewards representatives in the workplace.
209
 
Employers point out the difficulty of finding themselves in a situation where a third party, the 
CCMA arbitrator, decides issues relating to the constitution of the workplace forum or for joint 
decision making. Further, Weston and Lucio noted that even though statutory workplace 
employee-participation structures may improve and stabilise industrial relations, employers are 
often hostile to those structures as they are seen as too inflexible and may impede the company’s 
adaption to the rapidly changing global environment.
210
 This preference for non-statutory 
employee participation structures can also be seen in the South African context.
211
 According to 




Brand and Brassey further claim that Chapter 5 disadvantages management as the 
employer is not given the power in terms of the LRA to dissolve the forum once it has been 
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established. Moreover, management can neither influence its establishment nor is it party to the 
forum. Whilst management has the duty to disclose information and to negotiate with the union, 
unions do not have disclosure duties.
213
 
These concerns are often explained by the ‘fear of the unknown’. Both, trade unions and 
management in 1995 were unsure about how workplace forums would advance issues such as the 
democratisation of firms, the empowerment of workers, improving industrial relations and 
enhancing economic performance.
214
 Today, it seems, these suspicions on both sides are still not 
overcome which can be ascribed to the small number of forums established in the past 22 years 
and thus to the lack of experience of both parties. 
6. Proposed amendments in 2000 
In 2000, amendments to the LRA were proposed in the Labour Relations Amendment Bill to 
develop a more flexible approach and to make workplace forums less dependent on majority 
unions in an attempt to increase the popularity of workplace forums. One proposal was that in 
workplaces without a representative trade union, a registered trade union can apply to establish a 
workplace forum if the application is supported by non-union members and a majority of 
employees in the workplace as a whole support the application. Another proposal was to allow 
the majority of employees to apply to establish a workplace forum in a workplace in which there 
is no registered trade union.
215
 Finally, it was proposed that a workplace forum can be established 
in a workplace of fewer than 100 employees.
216
 These proposals were intended to enhance the 
opportunity for employees to establish workplace forums,
217
 ultimately leading to more forums 
being established. It remains unclear why they were ultimately not accepted but it is speculated 
that they were objected to by both unions and employers: Unions feared that they would 
undermine their efforts to organise and employers feared over-regulation of small businesses and 
increasing power of workplace forums.
218
 It was further brought forward that the amendment 
failed to address the following issues: 
 The preference afforded to majority unions. 
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 The enforceability and status of workplace agreements. 
 The overlapping functions that existed between trade unions and workplace forums 
 The lack of the right to initiate consultation and joint decision-making.219 
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the introduction of workplace forums was doomed to failure from the outset due to 
a reluctance of both affected parties, trade unions and employers. The insignificance of the 
provisions in Chapter 5 can be seen in the very small number of forums established as well as in 
the fact that there still is not one court decision dealing with the provisions. A revision of chapter 
5, therefore is long overdue. The question is whether the works council system in Germany can 
provide guidance in this regard. 
III. WORKS COUNCIL SYSTEM IN GERMANY 
As mentioned, the introduction of workplace forums was inter alia drawn on the history of 
successful worker participation in Germany through works councils. This chapter therefore gives 
an overview of the works council system and analyses the relationship between works councils 
and trade unions in Germany. 
1. History of employee participation 
In Germany, in the nineteenth century, a socialist trade union movement emerged, with the 
proclaimed aim to replace capitalism by socialism by way of revolution. Subsequently, in 1878, 
these trade unions were prohibited by law. However this had the opposite effect of trade unions 
developing undercover activities and led to an unintended strengthening of the movement so that 
their prohibition was abolished in 1890. One of the trade unions’ goals was to create class 
consciousness among the workers and thus, collective agreements were considered to be ‘pacts 
with the class enemy’. Still, in the 1870s employers and the socialist trade unions slowly started 
concluding collective agreements. 
In 1848, in the so-called ‘Parliament of the Paul’s Church’, a draft document on statutory bodies 
of workers’ participation was elaborated not by trade unions but by scholars mostly. This 
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document, however, did not have any immediate effect and the first workers’ participation bodies 
were voluntarily introduced in some of the big companies since the early 1870s. Weiss ascribed 
this development to the following four reasons:
220
 
First, employers tried to increase the legitimacy of rules of conduct in the workplace by 
integrating workers in determining such rules, thereby trying to eliminate conflicts. Further, 
company schemes of social assistance (before the Bismarck social security system was 
introduced in 1883) entailed a significant administrative effort which employers found profitable 
to transfer to the workers participation bodies without changing the power structure in the 
company. Thirdly, as the members of the representative bodies were chosen by the employer, 
they could easily be influenced and basically were ‘in the hands’ of the employers who used them 
as instruments of communication. Lastly, the reason for establishing such bodies was based on 
the employers’ idea that it promoted the integration of the employees into the company and 
created a spirit of identification with the companies which the employers expected would keep 
employees away from the socialist trade unions.
221
 
As one of the reasons for employers to introduce worker participation bodies was to 
minimise the emergence and influence of socialist trade unions, the trade unions strongly 
opposed statutory rules introduced in 1891 that provided for the introduction of representative 
bodies for workers in establishments of at least twenty employers. In terms of this legislation, 
representative bodies were elected by the workforce of the establishment and were not appointed 




During the so-called ‘strategy debate’
223
 the revolutionary strategy of the socialist trade 
union movement was replaced by another form of strategy that did not call into question the 
capitalist system as such but tried to restrict employers’ powers legally by introducing employees 
involvement in management decision making. This led to the recognition of trade unions as 
legitimate representatives of the workforce by the employers’ associations in a formal agreement 
signed in 1918. The parties agreed that collective bargaining should be the predominant 
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instrument of determining working conditions. From then on, trade unions tried to convert the 
works councils into their extended arm at the workplace. In 1919, as part of the Weimar 
Constitution, a statute was introduced that established bodies of employee representation called 
‘works councils’ in all workplaces of at least twenty employees.
224
 Upon request of the trade 
unions, section 8 was inserted which guaranteed that the introduction of works councils would 
not affect the unions’ activities – particularly collective bargaining. As trade unions today in 
South Africa still are, trade unions in Germany at that time were reluctant to cooperate with 
works councils and feared that they would be undermined and lose their influence in the 
workplace. However, they quickly saw the advantages of integrating works councils into their 
strategy and system and for example provided training for works council members. Further, trade 
unions fought for an amendment which was passed in 1928 in terms of which trade unions were 
allowed to submit lists of candidates for the election of works councils.
225
 After the Second 
World War between 1933 and 1945, the cooperation between trade unions and works councils 
was strengthened and the Statute on Works Councils was passed in 1952 which provided for 
several instruments that gave trade unions legal power to influence the works council system. For 
example, trade unions were given access to the labour court if the election of works councils was 
not conducted according to the law and they were given the right to initiate elections by calling a 
workforce meeting to decide the question by way of majority vote. Further, provisions were made 
in terms of which trade unions could provide support to works councils by accessing the 
employer’s premises or by assisting in workplace meetings for example. Members of works 
councils were educated by trade unions. The Works Constitution Act of 1972 (“WCA”) 
(‘Betriebsverfassungsgesetz’) that is still regulating works councils today is based on this 
legislation from 1952. 
It is evident from this overview that, despite initial mistrust and hostility of trade unions and 
employers towards statutory employee participation structures in the workplace, all parties 
adjusted to and benefit from, the system of worker representation. As Weiss pointed out, this was 
only possible due to the ‘jointly accepted understanding that collective bargaining and worker 
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participation fulfil different functions, that the one cannot simply be substituted for the other, and 
that each has merits of its own.’
226
 
2. The German legal framework 
The following part briefly describes the statutory framework of works councils. As the WCA 
consist of 130 sections including several election regulations, only the most important differences 
to the South African system are presented in this dissertation. 
a) Establishment of works councils 
Pursuant to section 1(1) of the WCA, every establishment that normally has five or more 
permanent employees older than 18 years, three of whom have been employed for at least six 
months can establish a works council. Contrary to the wording, according to which ‘works 
councils shall be elected […]’, the law does not compel employers to establish a works council. 
The establishment of a works council is at the discretion of the employees of the establishment 
and they can compel the employer’s support.
 227
  
The WCA only applies to private companies, whereas the Federal Law on Staff 
Committees in the Public Sector (‘Bundespersonalvertretungsgesetz’) provides for the 
establishment of employee participation structures in the form of staff councils in public 
companies. In 2015, according to research studies conducted in around 16.000 establishments
228
 
by the ‘IAB-Betriebspanel’, 41% of the employees in the private sector have been represented by 
works councils, whereas the relative amount of employees in the public sector represented by 
staff councils amounts to 91%.
229
 Furthermore, the research showed that the employer’s size 
plays a significant role: Whereas in establishments with 5-50 employees, 9% are represented by a 
works council, the percentage grows up to 89% in large companies.  
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Proportion of employees represented by a works council in relation to the amount of 





Size of the establishment 








5 to 50 employees 9 9 
51 to 100 employees 35 36 
101 to 199 employees 58 52 
200 to 500 employees 74 69 
More than 500 employees 89 87 
Total 42 33 
    Source of data: IAB-Betriebspanel (2015)
231
 
Works councils can be established in an ‘establishment’. The German Federal Labour Court has 
consistently defined an establishment as an organisational unit within which the employer solely 
or together with his employees continuously pursues specific purposes by means of material and 
immaterial resources.
232
 Pursuant to section 1(1) of the WCA, works councils can also be elected 
in ‘joint establishments of several companies’. A joint company is assumed to exist if the 
companies employ the equipment and workers jointly in order to pursue their working objectives 
or if splitting the company would have the effect that one or several departments of an 
establishment would be allocated to another company that is involved in the split, without thereby 
fundamentally changing the organization of the establishment concerned.
233
 
Like in South Africa, works councils represent all employees in the establishment; and an 
executive staff member does not constitute an ‘employee’ as defined in section 5 of the WCA.
234
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Executive staff members have their own representation structure which is governed by the 
Regulation of the Committee of the Senior Executives (‘Sprecherausschussgesetz’). 
The WCA provides for the establishment of additional bodies such as a central works council 
(‘Gesamtbetriebsrat’)
235
, a combined works council (‘Konzernbetriebsrat’)
236
 and a youth and 
trainee delegation (‘Jugend- und Auszubildendenvertretung’).
237
 However, these are not 
discussed further below. 
b) Works council members 
Regular elections of works councils take place every four years
238
 and the next regular election 
will be between 1 March and 31 May next year (2018) in all organisations. The Act provides for 
consistent regular works council elections in all establishments in order to facilitate the 
organisational preparation by trade unions.
239
 
The number of works council members depends on the number of employees entitled to 
vote in the establishment.
240
 As far as possible, the council should be composed of employees of 
various organisation units and different employment categories
241
 and the gender that accounts 
for a minority of staff shall at least be represented according to its relative numerical strength 
whenever the works council consists of three or more members.
242
 
Employees as well as every trade union represented in the establishment are entitled to submit 
lists of candidates,
243
 whereby each list of candidates submitted by the employees has to be 
signed by at least onetwentieth of the employees entitled to vote, and at least by three employees 
with voting rights.
244
 If more than three members of the works council are to be elected, the 
election is based on nomination lists which have to be submitted to the electoral board by eligible 
voters or trade unions.
245
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c) Powers of works councils 
The WCA provides for the following different forms of employee participation that can be 
exercised by the works council: 
 the right to be informed 
 the right to be consulted 
 the right of veto and 
 the right to co-determination. 
In the last two cases, the works council can block a decision by the employer as the employer is 
not entitled to take decisions without the prior approval of the works council.  
Firstly, the works council has a right to timely information by the employer in order to 
fulfil its general duties as contemplated in terms of section 80(1) of the WCA.
246
 In addition, the 
employer has to grant the works council access at any time to any documentation it may require 




The works council is also obliged to ensure that the employees in the establishment are 
treated in accordance with the principles of law and equity
248
 and to see that effect is given to 




Works councils are given the right to make proposals regarding measures benefiting the 
establishment and the staff such as a ban on smoking or health promotion.
250
 In addition, the right 
to be heard by the employer prior to certain actions being taken is of particular importance. 
Pursuant to section 102(1) of the WCA, the works council has to be consulted before every 
dismissal and the reasons for the dismissal have to be disclosed. A notice of dismissal that is 
given to an employee without previously consulting the works council is null and void. The 
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works council can raise only certain objections against the dismissal as specified in section 
102(3) of the WCA and has to do so in writing within a week giving its reason.
251
 Even though 
the WCA does not provide for a right of the works council to ultimately prevent an employee 
from being dismissed, the consultation of the works council is a prerequisite for a valid dismissal. 
Similarly, in companies with more than twenty employees the employer has to notify the works 
council previous to any recruitment, grading, regrading and transfer.
252
 The employer has to 
supply information on the person concerned and of the implication of the measure envisaged. The 
works council may only refuse its consent in certain cases expressly defined by section 99(2) of 
the WCA such as if the staff movement would constitute a breach of any Act, collective 
agreement or works agreement.
253
 If the works council refuses to consent and one of the 
requirements of section 99(2) of the WCA is met, the employer may not carry out the measure 
and has to apply to the labour court for a decision in lieu in terms of section 99(4) of the WCA. 
These rights are referred to as ‘veto-rights’ of the works council. 
Section 87 of the WCA, probably one of the most far-reaching rights of the works 
council, gives the works council the right to co-determination in a broad range of social matters 
such as rules of operation and the conduct of employees or the commencement and termination of 
the daily working hours as far as they are not prescribed by legislation or collective agreement. 
The employer cannot make a decision without the consent of the works council and if the parties 
are unable to reach an agreement, the conciliation committee makes a binding decision.
254
  
Moreover, the works council has to be informed and consulted in establishments that 
normally have more than twenty employees with voting rights if the employer plans an alteration 
which may entail substantial prejudice to the staff or a large sector thereof.
255
 The employer and 
the works council can then conclude a reconciliation of interest (‘Interessenausgleich’) in terms 
of section 112(1) of the WCA and an agreement on full or part compensation for any financial 
prejudice sustained by staff as a result of the proposed alterations (‘social compensation plan’, 
‘Sozialplan’ in German). If the parties cannot agree on a social compensation plan, either side can 
request the conciliation committee to make a binding award which takes the place of an 
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agreement between the employer and the works council.
256
 Therefore, in effect the works council 
is entitled to an enforceable right of co-determination. 
d) Works agreements 
In contrast to the South African system which does not regulate the status of agreements entered 
into between the workplace forum and the employer, the WCA provides that the parties can 
conclude legally binding works agreements (‘Betriebsvereinbarungen’). Works agreements are 
mandatory for the parties of the agreements and binding on the employees to whom they apply.
257
 
Hence, they don’t have to be incorporated in employment contracts or collective agreements in 
order to have effect. Pursuant to section 77(3) of the WCA, works agreements do not deal with 
remuneration and other conditions of employment that have been fixed or are normally fixed by 
collective agreement. This serves to protect the principle of the autonomy of collective 
bargaining enshrined in art 9(3) of the German Basic Law.
258
 It prevents the works council from 
acting as a ‘non-contributory trade union-replacement’, thereby competing with trade unions, and 
makes it impossible for works councils to undercut working conditions stipulated under 
collective agreements.
259
 As can be seen in this section, the WCA clearly separates the power of 
trade unions and works councils, guaranteeing the trade union’s supremacy when it comes to the 
regulation of working conditions.
260
 A collective agreement can, however, expressly authorise the 
making of supplementary works agreements by means of so-called ‘opening clauses’ 
(‘Öffnungsklauseln’) in union agreements.
261
  
The responsibility for the execution of works agreements lies with the employer and the 
works council may not interfere.
262
 Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, works 
agreements can be terminated by both parties at three months’ notice.
263
 However, in matters of 
co-determination, the provisions of the works agreements continue to apply even after its expiry 
until a fresh agreement is made.
264
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e) Dispute resolution 
Industrial action as a means of resolving disputes is expressly prohibited in terms of section 74(2) 
of the WCA. Both parties - that is: the employer and the works council - shall refrain from 
activities that interfere with operations or imperil peace in the establishment.
265
 
The WCA provides for the establishment of a conciliation committee (‘Einigungsstelle’) 
as a dispute resolution mechanism. If agreement is not reached between the parties, matters of 
joint decision-making (relating to social aspects of the decision) can be referred to the 
conciliation committee for binding arbitration, whereas other matters (such as managerial 
aspects) can be referred to non-binding arbitration. A conciliation committee can either be set up 
as a dispute arises or the works council and the employer can establish a standing conciliation 
committee by works agreement.
266
 The committee is composed of an equal number of assessors 
appointed by the employer and the works council as well as an independent chairman accepted by 
both parties.
267
 In matters where the conciliation committee’s award takes the place of the 
agreement between the employer and the works council, the conciliation committee must act at 
the request of either side.
268
 In all other matters, the committee can only act if both sides so 
request or agree to its intervention.
269
 In those cases the committee’s award only takes the place 
of an agreement between the employer and the works council if both sides have accepted it in 
advance or accept it subsequently.
270
 
The committee’s award is subject to judicial control.
271
 The employer as well as the works 
council may appeal to the labour court on the grounds that the conciliation committee has 
exceeded its powers. In matters of joint decision making, the application has to be made within 
two weeks of the date of notification of the award.
272
 
                                                 
265
 Section 74(2) of the WCA. 
266
 Section 76(1) of the WCA. 
267
 Section 76(2) of the WCA. 
268
 Section 76(5) of the WCA. 
269
 Section 76(6) of the WCA. 
270
 Section 76(6) of the WCA. 
271
 T Kania op cit (n258) § 76 BetrVG para 28. 
272





3. Relationship between trade unions and works councils 
a) Statutory framework 
The WCA provides for a clear separation of powers and duties between the works council and 
trade unions. Works councils are organisationally separated from and independent of trade 
unions.
273
 Section 2(3) of the WCA clarifies that the Act does not affect the functions of trade 
unions, particularly with regards to the representation of their members in the workplace, which 
serves to protect the trade unions’ freedom of association as guaranteed in terms of article 9(3) of 
the German Basic Law.
274
 Still, trade unions do not have the same power over works councils as 
trade unions in South Africa do over workplace forums. 
According to the law, it is irrelevant for the election and operation of a works council 
whether a trade union is represented in the workplace. The establishment of works councils in 
theory does not depend on a trade union trigger but in practice, the initiative for the establishment 
of a works council often comes from a trade union. 
The WCA provides for several rights of trade unions represented in the establishment. A 
trade union is represented in an establishment if it has at least one employee in the establishment 
as its member.
275
 Regarding the establishment of a works council, trade unions have a right to 
initiate this. Pursuant to section 14(3) and (5) of the WCA, trade unions represented in the 
establishment are entitled to submit lists of candidates for the works council election. Further, 
trade unions have the power to ensure that an electoral board is appointed
276
 and to contest an 
election that infringes the law before the labour court.
277
 
Delegates from the trade unions represented in the establishment must, after notice is 
given to the employer, be granted access to the establishment in order to permit them to exercise 
the powers and duties established by this Act. Access may be denied only if it does run counter to 
essential operational requirements, mandatory safety rules or the protection of trade secrets.
278
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They are further entitled to attend all works and department meetings in an advisory capacity.
279
 
However, they may only attend meetings of the works council in an advisory capacity on request 
of one-fourth of the members of the works council.
280
 In this event, the trade union representative 
is entitled to receive the agenda of the meeting and a copy of the minutes which concern it.
281
 
However, a representative trade union may require a works council to call a works meeting if no 
such meeting has been held during the preceding ‘calendar half year’.
282
 For the purpose of 
fulfilling their duties and as far as their proper discharge so require the works council can, subject 
to an agreement with the employer, call on the advice of experts such as trade union officials.
283
 
Representative trade unions are entitled to contest the outcome of a works council election 
in the labour court on certain procedural grounds.
284
 Moreover, pursuant to section 23(1) of the 
WCA, a trade union may apply to the labour court for an order to remove from office any 
member of the works council or to dissolve the council on the grounds of grave dereliction of its 
statutory duties. Trade unions further are entitled to apply to the labour court for an order 
requiring the employer to cease and desist from an act, or to allow an act to be performed or to 
perform an act, where the employer has grossly violated his duties under the WCA.
285
 
The primacy of collective bargaining is protected by section 77(3) of the WCA which 
provides that ‘works agreements shall not deal with remuneration and other conditions of 
employment that have been fixed or are normally fixed by collective agreement’. A matter is 
normally fixed in a collective agreement if the topic in question is normally bargained over. A 
collective agreement may, however, expressly authorise the making of supplementary works 
agreements by so-called opening clauses (‘Öffnungsklauseln’) in the collective agreement.
286
 
Furthermore, the WCA provides that ‘the employer and the works council shall work together in 
a spirit of mutual trust having regard to the applicable collective agreements and in co-operation 
with the trade unions and employers’ associations represented in the establishment for the good 
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of the employees and of the establishment.’
287
 Section 2(3) of the WCA further stipulates that the 
Act shall not affect the functions of trade unions and employers associations, particularly the 
representation of their members’ interests. These provisions serve as a framework for the 
interpretation of the parties’ statutory rights and duties and explicitly safeguard the primacy of 
collective bargaining. 
In summary, while trade unions have statutory initiating, supporting and controlling functions 
over works councils, works councils and both employee representation structures in Germany 
serve different functions and are institutionally and structurally separated. 
b) Mutual benefit 
In practice, in Germany a close cooperation between trade unions and works councils in which 
both mutually benefit has emerged over years despite a very clear division of labour. 
There is a clear separation between collective bargaining by trade unions on sectoral level 
and participation by works councils on plant level. This is done by way of separating presumably 
‘adversarial’ issues such as distributive issues from ‘non-adversarial’ ones such as productivity 
issues. This division has not been predetermined by the nature of the issues in question but rather 
is an outcome of a complex and still ongoing process of interaction between all affected 
parties.
288
 Distributive issues are concerned with the distribution of a company’s profit between 
its shareholders, employees and other stakeholders in a broader sense and are inherently 
confrontational. On the other hand, both employees and management have the same concerns 
over the productivity and profitability of a company which makes joint problem solving possible 
and can lead to gains for both, having regards to job security, increased wages and increased 
profits.
289
 While distributive issues are aimed at compelling one party to give up something, 
productivity issues are geared towards persuading both parties to realise a mutual gain.
290
 Even 
though workers and employers compete for the returns of the company, they have a common 
interest in increasing the ‘corporate cake’. 
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The functions of collective bargaining agreements are limited by the functions of the 
works council which are statutorily defined in the WCA and which can be extended by agreement 
between the employer and the trade union.
291
. Collective agreements are often concluded on 
sectoral/regional level, setting minimum standards for a whole sector as a framework, leaving the 
details of the day-to-day business in the company to the works councils on plant level. The 
adversarial nature of collective bargaining does not pass over to the discussion of workplace 
issues as neither plant managers nor plant representatives are involved in confrontational 
bargaining.
292
 Workplace disputes are not resolved by strikes as works councils are barred by law 
from economic action in terms of section 74(2) of the WCA. Disputes are instead resolved by 
way of compulsory arbitration in the form of a conciliation committee.
293
 
Usually, works agreements regulate the implementation and monitoring of standards set 
by collective agreement. If the employer by way of collective agreement agrees to reduce the 
weekly working hour in order to create new jobs for example, works councils are used to monitor 
the employer’s adherence to the agreement and to make sure that the goal of creating new jobs is 
not counteracted by increasing the employees’ overtime work.
294
 Collective agreements, 
providing only a framework of minimum standards to be observed, further often leave the 
implementation thereof to the works councils through opening clauses which expressly authorise 
the works council and the employer to conclude supplementary works agreements, taking into 
account the specific characteristics of the company/workplace concerned.
295
 Works agreements 
provide for more flexibility and can more easily be adjusted to changing conditions than 
collective agreements. A typical example would be a collective agreement regulating the average 
working time to be reached within a sector but leaving it to the works council to conclude an 
agreement about how the working time in each workplace will be distributed.
296
 Generally, there 
is a tendency towards decentralisation in Germany enabling companies to more flexibly adapt to 
ever-changing conditions and to be competitive on the global market.
297
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Trade unions and works councils are mutually dependent on each other. Although there is 
no requirement in law that for a works council to be elected there has to be a trade union present 
in the workplace, in practice it is often the trade unions that initiate the election process and 
provide employees with information about the benefits of having such an employee 
representation structure. As trade unions often present lists of candidates for the election, works 
council members in Germany, at least in part, often are trade union members.
298
 
Numerous studies have shown that employee participation is most effective in 
representing the employees’ interests in corporations that are highly unionised. It is suggested 
that without strong unionisation ‘works councils are effectively taken over by management, 
whatever the legal rights conferred on employees’.
299
 Further, works councils benefit from the 
trade unions’ resources especially with regards to training. Works council members are entitled to 
attend training and educational courses insofar as necessary for the fulfilment of their duties.
300
 
These courses are often offered by trade unions at special training facilities where they train their 
own officials along with works council members. This joint training can facilitate communication 
and interaction between both actors, enabling them to lay down common interest and to reduce 
trade unions’ suspicion and fear of works councils.
301
  
At the same time, trade unions benefit from having a works council in the workplace. 
They are often used by trade unions to recruit union members. Employee participation structures 
can provide an opening for the collective organisation of workers.
302
 According to Weiss, 
employees perceive works councils as trade union representatives in the workplace. They do not 
draw the distinction the law does by clearly separating these two institutions. In his words, ‘the 
mere existence of works councils tends to create a climate in the establishment which makes the 
employees more inclined to abide to collective structures, thereby paving the way for actual trade 
union membership’.
303
 Further, unions can gain from the knowledge and experience of highly 
skilled workers with regards to the production process, particularly in restructuring processes.
304
 
Work council members are constantly exposed to specific problems at the establishment and the 
                                                 
298
 Section 14(3) of the WCA. 
299
 Klerck op cit (n7) 27. 
300
 Section 37(6), (7) of the WCA. 
301
 Weiss op cit (n220) 163. 
302
 Summers op cit (n171) 811. 
303
 Weiss op cit (n220) 164. 
304





acquired skills and experience and knowledge about day-to-day problems on workplace level can 
be put to good use by trade unions and their overall strategy. 
All in all, today trade unions and works councils in Germany do not see each other as 
competitors but rather benefit from each other. In this regard, the preconditions in Germany and 
South Africa differ greatly. 
IV. DETERMINANTS FOR A LEGAL TRANSPLANT 
The Ministerial Legal Task Team responsible for the draft LRA drew extensively on international 
experience in the field of labour law. It was assisted by the International Labour Organisation as 
well as international experts such as Professor Weiss who is considered to have provided the 
impetus for the introduction of a worker representation system on workplace level, drawing on 
the German works council system. As analysed above, some ideas and concepts of the German 
system such as the election of a worker representation committee consisting of workers, were 
transplanted into the LRA, while other provisions such as the emphasis on representative trade 
unions were specifically tailored to the South African background and preconditions. This raises 
the general question whether and under what conditions legal concepts relating to collective 
labour relations can be transplanted from one system to another. The German scholar of labour 
and comparative law Otto Kahn-Freund said that ’rules and institutions relating to collective 
labour relations are usually too closely connected with the structure and organisation of political 
power in a particular environment to be successfully imported elsewhere’.
305
 According to him, 
foreign law is usually used in the process of law making for three different reasons: First, the 
object of considering foreign law may be to prepare the international unification of the law, 
secondly, to give legal effect to a social change shared by the foreign country with one’s own 
country and thirdly, to promote a social change which foreign law is designed to express or to 
produce.
306
 The workplace forum system was introduced in order to achieve a co-operative 
dialogue between management and labour with the aim of improving productivity and 
competitiveness on the global market. It therefore falls under the third category which Kahn-
Freund identifies as the most difficult one. With regard to labour relations, Kahn-Freund 
suggested that individual labour law such as rules on substantive terms of employment can be 
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transplanted easily, especially between countries which have reached similar stages of economic 
development, whereas collective labour law such as rules on collective bargaining and strikes 
cannot as they are inextricably linked to their social and especially political context.
307
 Generally, 
comparative law can only be used for practical purposes if the context of the respective law is 
taken into account.
308
 Bob Hepple, one of the experts involved in drafting the LRA, suggested 
that concepts and ideas but not specific institutions can be transplanted from one legal system 
into another provided that the following four essential requirements are met (1) a social 
consensus between business and labour, (2) an organic relationship between a specific social 
need and the form of the regulation adopted, (3) an internationalist and open-minded legal 
culture, and (4) the form of labour law adopted must contribute to improved national economic 
performance.
309
 As pointed out above, both employers and trade unions opposed the introduction 
of statutory workplace forums as they were afraid of forfeiting their power
310
 Thus, the first of 
Hepple’s requirements is not satisfied. Concerns are also raised about whether employee 
participation actually leads to an increase in productivity and global competitiveness or rather is a 
hindrance to economic success.
311
 Concepts cannot be extracted from a legal system without 
having regard to the logic of the foreign system, the interaction of its different elements and the 
historical context and all the factors that have led to the system as it presents itself today.
312
 
Hepple further suggests that once foreign concepts are incorporated into South African Law by 
legislation or judicial decision, they have to be interpreted in the light of the specific context and 
needs of South African labour relations.
313
 
Bean has conducted research into cross national variations of employee participation 
structures and identifies the following four determinants: (1) domestic cultural and ideological 
factors, (2) differences in collective bargaining structures, (3) nature of the power relations 
between employers, trade unions and the state and (4) the particular historical circumstances in 
which employee participation structures were first introduced.
314
 It is also important to note that 
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employee participation structures have mostly been introduced in a situation of crisis: In South 
Africa, workplace forums were introduced to facilitate workplace democracy and increase 
productivity which was one of the objectives of the White Paper for a post-apartheid South 
Africa. 
The social dynamics and labour market conditions in Southern Africa differ substantially 
from those in European first world countries such as Germany. According to Fenwick and Kalula 
who conducted a comparative study of Southern African and East Asian labour law in 2001, 
labour markets in Southern Africa are characterised by extreme income inequality often 
coinciding with racial differences, a high unemployment rate, a low skills level, massive poverty, 
large-scale labour migration and a vast informal economy in which a majority of the working 
people earn their living.
315
 Labour Law therefore covers only a minority of the population, 
leaving most workers unprotected. While foreign labour law concepts aimed at protecting 
workers in the formal sector are still relevant, the authors suggest that labour law in Southern 
Africa has to develop an indigenous paradigm, focusing on job creation, control of immigration, 
training and education of workers and social security.
316
 
Therefore, it is inconceivable to transplant a whole German concept of employee 
participation with all its provisions into the South African legal system. As was shown above, the 
preconditions such as the relationship between trade unions, employers and employees, the 
economic and cultural climate as well as the labour market at the time of the introduction of 
Chapter 5 into the LRA was and still is completely different. Provisions that succeeded in 
Germany will not necessarily have the same impetus in the South African context. The drafters of 
the LRA recognised this and made major changes to the German system, trying to adapt it to the 
South African context, for example by not restricting the right to strike; by making the 
representative trade union the only trigger for the establishment of the forum; and by allowing 
representative trade unions to force the employer to establish forums only in workplaces with 
more than 100 employees.  
Since these provisions have failed and are still failing 22 years after their introduction in 
1995, however, it is time to reconsider the legal framework and make long overdue changes.  
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The following proposes several amendments to the LRA in an attempt to make statutory forums 
more attractive to both trade unions and employers and to facilitate a cooperative dialogue 
between management and labour.  
1. Facilitate the establishment of workplace forums  
The establishment of workplace forums should be facilitated by lowering the threshold of 
100 employees and by allowing not only the representative trade union but also minority 
unions, employees and employers to apply for its establishment. 
The application of the statutory provisions in Chapter 5 is starkly limited to only a small number 
of workplaces due to the threshold of 100 employers and the fact that only majority unions may 
apply for the establishment of a workplace forum.
317
 To achieve workplace democracy and 
cooperative dialogue between trade unions and management instead of an adversarial 
environment at the workplace, the dependency of workplace forums on representative trade 
unions has to be abolished. In the current system, workplace forums will try to please the 
representative trade union as their existence is at the union’s discretion. The dependency on a 
union for a workplace forum to be established disempowers non-unionised employees and 
severely threatens the promotion of the needs of the employees as a whole and the promotion of 
employee participation the LRA strives for.
318
 It carries the danger that employees who are not 
members of the majority union may feel alienated from the participation process and not commit 
themselves fully to the forum.
319
 Therefore, minority unions and employees in the workplace 
should be given the right to apply for the establishment of a forum along with representative trade 
unions.  
Another contradiction in the system is revealed by the fact that in terms of the Act 
employers cannot initiate the establishment of workplace forums even though they are supposed 
to benefit both management and labour.
320
 The only option for employers currently is to initiate 
non-statutory employee participation structures in the workplace, thereby putting pressure on 
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unions to secure their extensive rights regarding statutory workplace forums by establishing one 
in terms of the LRA.
321
 As employers can benefit from the establishment from the forum too, 
they should also be given the right to initiate its establishments. Unions will be safeguarded by 
other measures such as the reintroduction of the duty to bargain.
322
 
Moreover, the threshold of 100 employees in the current system has to be lowered so that the 
statutory provisions cover more workplaces. To protect smaller businesses, particularly the 
financial interests of start-ups, given the current economic situation and in order to avoid even 
further discouragement of foreign investment, a threshold closer to 20 employees would appear 
feasible 
2. Exclude the right to strike 
Workplace disputes should not be resolved by strikes but by a special dispute resolution 
mechanism. 
The LRA does not exclude the possibility for employees to strike if an agreement on consultation 
matters (section 84 of the LRA) is not reached. This introduces an adversarial element typically 
used by trade unions in a relationship that is aimed at being cooperative and blurs the distinction 
between distributive issues (subject to collective bargaining) and non-distributive issues (ideally 
dealt with by workplace forums). In the words of Olivier, ‘it is at the very essence of cooperative 
systems that parties should not be allowed to use their economic weapons when agreement 
cannot be reached, but rather to make use of appropriate alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms’
323
. In Germany, the works council as well as the employer are barred by law from 
industrial action and they both shall refrain from any activities that interfere with operations or 
imperil the peace in the establishment.
324
 The so-called ‘peace obligation’ has proven to be very 
efficient in keeping out the adversarial nature of collective bargaining from workplace level. This 
does not mean that negotiations between works councils and employers over workplace issues 
cannot get very heated and hostile, however, problems are not solved by the use of economic 
power but by negotiation and, as a final resort, by mediation and arbitration through the 
conciliation committee. The fact that the right to strike is not excluded for consultation matters 
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makes workplace forums an extension of the collective bargaining system contrary to the 
intended institutional separation which allows for a cooperative relationship on workplace 
level.
325
 The Act has introduced an alternative dispute resolution mechanism if the parties cannot 
agree on matters of joint-decision making.
326
 Ideally, the right to strike should be excluded and a 
similar dispute resolution mechanism introduced for matters of consultation.
327
 
3. Clear demarcation of collective bargaining and workplace forum structures 
Trade Unions and workplace forums should be more clearly institutionally and structurally 
separated. Bargaining councils should be used for centralised bargaining. 
As shown above
328
, the provisions of the LRA lead to tension and a demarcation conflict, 
resulting from the coexistence of two systems of employee representation at the workplace level, 
workplace forums and plant level bargaining. Both representation structures are currently free to 
call for a strike to resolve disputes. The trade unions’ fear of losing influence and power on plant 
level, together with the provision that only representative trade unions may initiate the 
establishment of workplace forums, is one of the reasons for the small number of forums 
established. 
In order to prevent demarcation conflicts between trade unions and workplace forums, both 
employee participation structures should be clearly institutionally and structurally separated.
329
 
This separation has proven successful in Germany and is even more important in the South 
African context of adversarialism and trade unions losing influence and power. The LRA tries to 
keep these functions separate by promoting sectoral bargaining,
330
 however, in practice, plant 
level bargaining often still is favoured by employers and especially small unions. Collective 
bargaining must be restricted to central levels, whereas workplace forums deal with the day-
today-issues at plant level.
331
 Bargaining councils can and should be used for centralised 
bargaining to avoid plant level bargaining. Unlike Summers suggested, there is no need to 
include a provision in the LRA that elected union representatives cannot be candidates for the 
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workplace forum in order to achieve formal separation.
332
 Forums will benefit from the shop 
stewards’ knowledge and experience. However the option of a trade union based forum in which 
workplace forums consist merely of shop stewards
333
 should be removed. Further, the boundaries 
for each representation structure and the issues for collective bargaining and those for workplace 
forums should be clearly statutory defined in order to avoid conflict resulting from an overlap of 
functions between these two institutions.
334
 The matters for consultation and joint decision-
making should be explicitly tabled in a code of good practice and the representative trade union 
and the employer should not be provided with the right to exclude these minimum rights in a 
collective agreement. 
4. Reduce the influence of majority unions and empower employees 
Workplace forums should not merely be an extended arm of majority unions on workplace 
level as they are representing all employees in the workplace. Therefore, the influence of 
majority unions should be reduced and employees should be given more power. 
Another difficulty with the statutory provisions is that they put majority unions in a privilege 
position, in accordance with the general principle of majoritarianism favoured in the LRA
335
. The 
LRA gives majority trade unions extensive control over the establishment, functioning and 
dissolution of workplace forums.
336
 In a trade union based forum in terms of section 81 of the 
LRA, for instance, the trade union chooses the representatives for the workplace forum. This 
provision undermines the notion of ‘workplace democracy’ the Chapter 5 strives for. A trade 
union based forum is just another union tool, in effect shop stewards are given the rights and 
functions in terms of Chapter 5.
337
 Shop stewards are then occupying opposing roles which 
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Workplace forums are entrusted with representing all employees in the workplace.
339
 In order 
to fulfil their corporative function and to achieve workplace democracy, they have to be separated 
from the collective bargaining framework. To truly foster workplace democratisation, employees 
in the workplace rather than the representative trade union have to be provided with more rights 
and influence on the forum. Therefore, the following proposals are made: 
 Section 81 of the LRA (trade union based workplace forum) should be removed.  
 A certain number of employees should have the power to request a ballot to dissolve the 
workplace forum. 
 There should be a list of inalienable, statutory defined matters for consultation and joint 
decision-making that cannot be removed by way of collective agreement. 
 It is suggested that section 82(1)(f) of the LRA be removed: Once a workplace forum is 
established, it should remain in office unless dissolved on request of the employees. If the 
forum is elected by all employees and charged with representing the interests of all 
employees in the workplace, a change of the majority union cannot have any influence on 
the composition of the forum. 
 Section 82(1)(v) of the LRA, according to which the representative trade union and the 
employer may, by agreement, change the constitution of the workplace forum, should be 
removed. This provision is not consistent with the basic idea of Chapter 5 that the 
provisions of the constitution are ideally based on a collective agreement agreed upon 
between the employer, the majority union and any registered trade union that has 
members employed in the workplace.
340
 This leads to the obvious question why a 
majority union should be empowered to change the constitution without the consent of 
other unions.  
5. Reintroduce the duty to bargain on sectoral level 
The duty to bargain should be reintroduced on sectoral level to strengthen trade unions and 
reduce their fear of workplace forums. 
The duty to bargain, developed under the Labour Relations Act 57 of 1981, was replaced in 1995 
by a system that promotes collective bargaining ‘by providing a series of organisational rights for 
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unions and by fully protecting the right to strike’.
341
 However, due to the decrease in trade union 
membership and collective bargaining coverage, trade unions are weakened and often lack the 
economic power to compel the employer to bargain seriously. This culminated in the collapse of 
the collective bargaining system in the mining industry and the Marikana massacre in 2012. 
Workers use violence during strikes as it has proven effective throughout the years. They feel 
powerless and violence is often seen as the only way to get attention.
342
 In contrast, trade unions 
in Germany are economically powerful and prosperous and often succeed in wage negotiations.  
Against this backdrop, it is discussed whether the duty to bargain should be reintroduced to 
secure the trade unions’ right to collective bargaining
343
 and to counterbalance the loss of union 
power. Once unions are perceived as more powerful by workers, the membership number will 
also increase which, in turn, strengthens unions. To avoid conflicts between unions and 
workplace forums on workplace level, the duty to bargain should be restricted to bargaining on 
sectoral level. The reintroduction of a duty to bargain might reduce the unions’ fear and mistrust 
towards other forms of employee representation on workplace level and pave the way for unions 
to engage more enthusiastically in the establishment of workplace forums.
344
 
6. Provide for binding works agreements 
Chapter 5 should provide for a legally binding and enforceable agreement between the 
workplace forum and the employer. 
The current system does not facilitate management and workplace forums to conclude legally 
binding agreements. The consensus reached between the parties can only have legal effect to the 
extent that it is incorporated in a binding workplace rule, contracts of employment or a 
subsequent collective agreement. Relying on a collective agreement makes the parties dependent 
on trade unions and having to incorporate rules in the employment contracts defeats the purpose 
of collective participation. Hence, to facilitate employee participation in the workplace 
independent from trade unions, statutory provision for legally binding agreements between the 
parties, similar to those in Germany
345
, should be included in Chapter 5. This strengthens the 
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rights of workplace forums and simplifies the enforcement of the consensus reached between the 
parties. Further, works agreements provide more legal certainty and reduce conflicts about what 
the parties agreed on. 
7. Give workplace forums the right to initiate consultation and joint-decision making 
Workplace forums should not be excluded from the right to initiate the consultation and 
joint decision making process. 
In the current system, the right to initiate the consultation and joint decision-making process is 
restricted to employers. The workplace forum cannot raise new issues. This departure from 
international law was intended to appease employers’ concerns about interference with their 
management prerogative.
346
 However, it is incompatible with the idea of cooperation the 
introduction of employee participation is based on. The current system risks management seeing 
employee participation as a mere formality without truly engaging in the process. Giving the 
forum the right to initiate the process strengthens employees and puts pressure on employers to 
take the process seriously. Further, due to their special knowledge and experience about the 
production process, employees might have suggestions for improvement management can benefit 
from economically. 
8. Promote non-statutory participation structures 
Employee participation should not be made entirely voluntary. However, the emphasis on 
individual non-statutory structures should be maintained. 
One of the main principles underpinning the LRA is the principle of voluntarism. The LRA does 
not impose a duty to bargain on the employer
347
 and the bargaining council system is a voluntary 
system. The fact that non-statutory employee participation structures flourished after the 
introduction of workplace forums is evidence of the parties’ (employers as well as trade unions) 
preference to voluntarist industrial relation systems.
348
 Therefore, some authors suggest that 
chapter 5 should be removed from the LRA entirely as workplace forums should be voluntary 
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structures triggered by both parties.
349
 However, the LRA currently places a great emphasis on 
individual structures already: Chapter 5 does not exclude non-statutory forums and even if the 
representative trade union applied for the establishment of a workplace forum in terms of section 
80(2) of the LRA, the provisions only apply if the parties cannot agree on an individual structure 
determined in a collective agreement.
350
 Even if employers and trade unions do not see a benefit 
in establishing a workplace forum yet as South African workplaces cannot draw upon positive 
experience with forums, they at least serve as an incentive to establish voluntary structures as 
studies have shown.
351
 Once voluntary structures prove to be successful, all parties in the 
workplace might become more open to employee participation and cooperation in general. 
Therefore, I do not agree that Chapter 5 should be removed entirely from the LRA. Rather, the 
emphasis on voluntary and individual structures, tailored to the relationships in the respective 
workplace, should be maintained. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Studies into voluntary employee participation structures in South Africa provide evidence that 
participation by unions and employee representatives in consultation and joint decision-making 
can be meaningful and effective and have a positive effect on workplace efficiency, workplace 
relationships and economic sustainability.
352
 Thus, the policy objectives of the legislator are in 
principle achievable in the South African context. However, the statutory system provided for in 
Chapter 5 of the LRA has been of very little significance in the past 22 years. Labour relations 
are still adversarial and trade unions are weak and fear that workplace forums might further 
undermine and weaken their position in the workplace. Amendments to Chapter 5 are long 
overdue. 
This thesis proposes to amend the LRA, having regard to the German provisions 
providing for works councils in establishments with five or more employees. Legal systems 
emerge under different legal, social and economic circumstances and can therefore not blindly be 
transplanted from one legal system to another. The preconditions such as the relationship 
between trade unions, employers and employees, the economic climate as well as the labour 
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market in South Africa was – at the time of the introduction of the new LRA – and still is 
completely different from the situation in Germany. Still, provided that these different 
backgrounds are kept in mind, comparative studies into the success story of works councils in 
Germany can contribute to developing a participation system that might be more attractive to 
both employers and trade unions. It is therefore recommended to adapt some German 
ideas/concepts, while other changes such as the reintroduction of the duty to bargain are 
specifically tailored to the South African context. 
Knudsen, comparing employee participation structures in Europe, identified the following 
three preconditions for an employee participation structure to be successful in the long-term
353
: 
First, employer and employees have to recognise each other as parties with divergent but 
legitimate interests, meaning that employees recognise the prosperity of the company as 
important, whereas employers see job security and well-being of employees as important. 
Secondly, both parties must see a benefit in moving away from adversarialism to cooperation. 
Lastly, the relationship between the parties has to be characterised by mutual trust: Employers 
must trust workers to have the necessary skills to participate in decision-making and not to 
misuse their increased power influence and, at the same time, employees must trust management 
not to be excluded from the benefits of their effort.
354
 It is further suggested that as greater trust 
develops between the workplace forum, trade unions and the employer, all parties will be more 
comfortable that the forum deals with a greater number of issues.
355
 It seems as if South Africa 
still lacks these preconditions, in particular the trust relationship between labour and 
management. German history has shown, however, that a change of perceptions is possible, given 
that both parties ultimately benefit from employee participation structures. Apart from changes in 
legislation, therefore, effort should be put into educating all parties of the benefits of worker 
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